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Rules for Interpreting Incomplete Contracts: A
Cautionary Note
Steven L. Harris*
I am very honored to have been invited to participate in this
symposium in honor of Bill Hawkland. Many thanks to Jim Bowers
for coming up with the idea and to Jim, as well as the Louisiana Law
Review, for bringing it to successful fruition.
I am especially pleased to participate because of my longtime
connection with Bill Hawkland. The University of Illinois College of
Law, on whose faculty I served for a dozen years, is among a very
small number of major law schools that do not merely value, but
prize, contributions to law reform-and particularly to the reform of
commercial law-as well as "practical" and "doctrinal" scholarship.
I have no doubt that this welcoming attitude was a direct consequence
of Bill Hawkland's having served two tours of duty at Illinois.
Some years ago, I had the great pleasure of working closely with
Bill on the revision of U.C.C. Article 6 on bulk sales, first as the
advisor from the American Bar Association and then as Bill's co-
reporter. I suspect the Article 6 project was unique in the history of
private legislatures. Given this group's interests, perhaps the history
of Article 6 deserves a few words here.' The Drafting Committee
was charged with the task of revising Article 6. But rather than
accept its jurisdiction, or even expand it, as so many committees are
wont to do, the committee (very soon after its appointment) actually
tried to put itself out of business by recommending repeal. In
response, the Executive Director of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") informed us
that our charge from the Scope and Program Committee was to revise
Article 6, and that we lacked jurisdiction to recommend repeal. So
we got to work and revised the Article. Three years later, when the
Article was up for approval at the NCCUSL Annual Meeting, it
became clear from the floor discussion that some Committee
members had reservations about the entire concept of a bulk sales
law. Ultimately, the members were asked to indicate their
preferences, as between the revision they had worked several years to
fashion and repeal. With one exception, the members favored repeal,
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* Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar and Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent
College of Law. The author thanks Douglas Baird and Claire Hill for helpful
suggestions.
1. For a fuller discussion of the process by which U.C.C. Article 6 was revised
see Steven L. Harris, Article 6: The Process and the Product-An Introduction, 41
Ala. L. Rev. 549 (1990).
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and NCCUSL adopted this position as its primary recommendation.2
Bill's and the Committee's work did not go completely for naught.
For those states that chose not to revise, NCCUSL recommended
adoption of the revised version. To date, only five states have
adopted the revision, while over 40 have repealed. My strong hunch
is that Bill has not been disappointed with the outcome.
Having cut my teeth on Article 6, I was asked to serve on the
Study Committee for U.C.C. Article 2 and then to join Chuck
Mooney as a reporter for the Drafting Committee to Revised U.C.C.
Article 9. After more than a decade of active involvement in reform
of commercial law, I cannot help but view the Bowers and Scott
debate3 on the appropriate role that context should play in the
interpretation of contracts through the eyes of a statutory draftsman.
It is from this perspective that I offer these comments.
Although abstract debates are both interesting and helpful, any
substantial change in judicial conduct is likely to require a legislative
solution. The inherent limits to such a solution are substantial. First,
these issues are complex. Under what circumstances may a court
look to evidence of context? Which facts are relevant? What is the
relationship between the context and the written agreement of the
parties? In addition, the statutory rules need to be comprehensible to,
and readily susceptible to proper application by judges with
incomplete and imperfect information. Given the vast array of
different facts and circumstances upon which the U.C.C. operates and
the broad range of judicial talent, one must expect that the legal
regime will not generate the "right" answer in every case. The
question is whether the U.C.C.'s provisions for interpreting contracts
in context can be materially improved upon.
No one can deny the appeal of interpreting the language of a
contract in context. Like other documents, contracts are drafted
against a host of background assumptions and understandings, some
of which are quite basic. Strategic considerations aside, the cost of
bringing all these assumptions from the background to the conscious
mind and reducing them to writing often is prohibitive. The errors
that can arise from failing to interpret contracts in light of these
unexpressed assumptions and understandings are so readily apparent
2. Not coincidentally, the lone dissenter represented the Commercial Law
League of America, a trade organization that, among other things, promotes the
interests of unsecured creditors.
3. Compare, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law:
A Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in The
Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law 149 (Jody S. Kraus
& Steven D. Walt eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000), with James W. Bowers,
Incomplete Law: On the Inevitable Inadequacies of Codes, Civil and Commercial,
62 La. L. Rev 1229 (2002,). [hereinafter "Bowers"].
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and potentially egregious that, if the goal of contract law is to give
effect to the parties' actual agreement (or, in the words of the U.C.C.,
"the bargain of the parties in fact"), resort to matters outside the
express language of the parties would appear to be essential.
Jim Bowers' discussion of how courts would construe a contract
to build a building with perfectly straight walls provides a perfect
example,4 as does the familiar example in the U.C.C. context of a
contract for the sale of two-by-four's. Anyone with any familiarity
with the subject matter of these contracts knows that the parties
actually contemplate neither perfectly straight walls nor boards that
are two inches by four inches. Interpreting these contracts solely by
using Webster's dictionary gets us to what I think all will agree are
the wrong answers. Assuming we want to enforce the actual
agreement of the parties, reference to something other than the
standard dictionary is essential. At a minimum, we must look to
usage of trade.
One might argue that parties who intend for their words to be
understood in context should express that intention in their written
agreement. The U.C.C. rejects that approach and makes clear that
even if a particular contracting party is not aware of a usage of his
trade applicable to the transaction in question, his contract
nevertheless will be interpreted in the light of that usage.5 This
notion, that if you are going to play the game, you are deemed to
know the rules (a variation on the theme of ignorantia legis neminem
excusat) prevents the kind of costly and potentially indeterminate
inquiry that would arise if one inquired into the subjective intentions
of the parties. It says to merchants: If you don't want to be bound by
trade usage, you must incur the costs of learning the usage of your
trade and expressly contracting out of it.
This burden is similar, but not identical, to the one that formalists
would impose by limiting interpretation to the "plain meaning" of the
contract. Parties who wished to use language in a manner that would
counteract the meaning otherwise attributed to it by the interpretive
device (i.e., the dictionary or the relevant usage of trade) would need
first to appreciate the need to do so. That is, they would need to be
informed of the rule of interpretation (which is no small assumption)
and to realize that the meaning they ascribe (in their heads) to crucial
terms differs from that of the interpretive device. Having realized the
need to take into account the interpretive device, they must then either
translate their bargain effectively from their own language to that of
4. See Bowers, supra note 3, at 1269-1274.
5. "A course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade ... of which
-they are or should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify
1:erms of an agreement." U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (2001).
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the dictionary or indicate unambiguously that the particular usage of
trade should not be applied. My hunch is that, in the aggregate, the
burden of the dictionary rule is greater. Usage of trade, by definition,
has substantial regularity of observance, so much so that it is
relatively unlikely that parties will seek to contract out of it and more
difficult for parties to recognize that their words express a
specialized, rather than a dictionary, meaning.
Assuming then, that one's goal is not to force parties to express
the interpretive context in their written agreements, the objection to
the U.C.C.'s scheme of interpreting words in context cannot be to the
use of any and all information other than the express words of the
contract to understand what the parties are talking about. Some of
that information must be available to guide in interpretation if we
wish to give effect to the parties' bargain. On the other hand, as Jim
Bowers points out, legal rules determine outcomes based on particular
facts.7 The problem is that we cannot have a separate rule legal rule
for each possible set of facts. As is so often the case in law, we need
to find the right level of generality-the right mix of rules and
standards-so that the courts have sufficient guidance to lead them to
the right results, to enable the parties to plan their dealings with
sufficient certainty, and to yield outcomes that appear to be
sufficiently grounded in law so as to promote respect for the courts
and the rule of law.
In determining the bargain of the parties in fact, the U.C.C. limits
the relevant facts to objective manifestations that are thought to
reflect that bargain or give meaning to the parties' expression of
it-usage of trade, course of dealing, course of performance, and the
like. One complaint, as I understand it, is that these interpretive
guides, at least as applied by the courts, don't yield the right answers.8
Of course, to conclude that the courts got it wrong, we ourselves must
know what the parties really intended. Determining intent is
exceedingly difficult, given that a party may hold mixed and
conflicting attitudes and ideas at any given time, that these may be
quite nuanced and fact-specific, and, as research into cognition has
shown, that one's understanding of one's own intent may even
depend on how the question is phrased. In many cases, a party may
have formed no specific intention with respect to the meaning of
particular terms of the contract in a given setting. So the very
exercise itself may be indeterminate.
Let's assume that courts are making mistakes more often than we
think necessary. One cause may be the way in which courts apply the
6. See U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (2001).
7. Bowers, supra note 3, at 1240.
8. Scott, supra note 3.
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rules. Certainly there are lines to be drawn. Consider, for example,
the U.C.C.'s rules concerning usage of trade.9 Does the usage in
question "give particular meaning to" or "supplement" or "qualify"
express terms of an agreement? In other words, when I refer to a two
by four, do I "mean" a board one and one-half inches by three and
one-half inches (which are the standard dimensions of a two by four)?
If so, then the trade usage (assuming it has sufficient "regularity of
observance") should be utilized for that purpose. Or is the trade
usage such that it would be unreasonable to construe the express
terms of the contract (two by four) as being consistent with the trade
usage - that is with a board one and one-half inches by three and
one-half inches? The context in which the issue arises may have
some influence on the outcome. For example, it might be easier for
a lumber merchant who provided boards that are one and one-half
inches by three and one-half inches to persuade the court that two by
four means one and one-half inches by three and one-half inches than
it would be for a buyer who rejected boards that actually were two by
four to persuade the court that a two-inch by four-inch board is not
a two by four. In any event, courts are asked to draw lines all the
time. The line-drawing exercise seems no more difficult here than it
is elsewhere; the need to draw this line (and similar lines) with
respect to context does not explain why courts misinterpret sales
contracts more often than other contracts (if in fact they do).
Another possible source of error is that judges have misapplied
the U.C.C.'s rules of interpretation, by failing to give proper weight
to certain evidence such as the express terms of the contract or by
interpreting the contract by reference to matters that should not be
taken into account under the U.C.C.'s scheme.'" Perhaps we should
reconsider the articulation of these rules in the U.C.C.. Are the rules
difficult to understand? Do they make clear that the search for
subjective intention must be conducted only by reference to objective
manifestations, such as usage of trade, course of dealing, and course
of performance? Or, is the invitation to determine the parties'
agreement "by implication from other circumstances" too
open-ended? Are the limitations on the use of usage of trade, course
of dealing, and course of performance not strong enough to overcome
possible preconceptions and cognitive biases? For example, are the
admonitions in Sections 1-205 and 2-208, that "express terms
control" course of dealing and course of performance, sufficient to
overcome any bias that "actions speak louder than words"?
9. U.C.C. § 1-205(2), (3), (4) (2001).
10. Elsewhere in this symposium, Bob Hillman has suggested that this is not
the case, at least as regards course of performance. See Robert A. Hillman, More
in Defense of U.CC. Methodology, 62 La. L. Rev. 1153 (2002).
11. The standards for determining whether there is a relevant usage of trade,
2002] 1283
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It may be that judges simply are not competent to apply these
concepts properly, but the concepts do not seem to be any more
difficult than others that we require our judges to apply. Perhaps the
proper application of usage of trade and the like requires more
knowledge of business practices, or of the practices of a particular
business, than judges bring to the job or acquire during the case.
Lawyers have the responsibility to discover, present, and assist courts
in analyzing the context in which contracts are entered into and
performed. As Jim Bowers correctly points out, construing contracts
by reference to context is "expensive lawyering."' 2 No doubt some
cases do not justify the expense. But in those that do, the lawyers
need to understand that, to do the job right, they must incur the
expense. The lawyer must know to look for the context. Part of the
problem may be that the lawyers whose job it is to inform the court
do not understand the transactions themselves. This may be a
function of the fact that most litigators do not specialize in the
transactions of a particular industry. Although the client often is a
useful source of information concerning relevant commercial
practices (for example, the client is likely to be informed of relevant
usage of trade), in other circumstances the client may not be able to
help. In some cases, the lawyer's failure to educate the court may be
a function of bad lawyering. I'm sure I am not the only symposium
participant who has been asked for advice about structuring a legal
argument in a commercial case after discovery has been closed. And
I've seen many cases of litigators in large firms-lawyers who are
least likely to be informed of trade usage and the like-who have
pursued litigation to conclusion without even consulting with the
lawyers who negotiated the contract at issue.
Another concern about the current state of affairs is that the
judicial opinions construing contracts under Article 2 do not enable
parties to predict accurately how their contracts will be construed in
the event of a dispute (i.e., that predictability is inherently in tension
with the U.C.C.'s "incorporation" strategy). 3 In one sense, there may
be only a little tension. Everyone can predict that not only the express
words but also other objective manifestations will be used to
course of dealing, or course of performance, and the rules for using these facts in
the interpretation of contracts, are much clearer than the guidance given with
respect to certain other gap-fillers, such as "commercially reasonable" and "good
faith." Although Section 1-204 sets forth the considerations to be taken into
account when determining what constitutes a "reasonable time," the U.C.C. does not
expressly require the court to refer to actual commercial practice when determining
what is "commercially reasonable." Perhaps it should. But the U.C.C. does require
recourse to agreed standards of reasonableness if the standards themselves are "not
manifestly unreasonable." U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (2001).
12. Bowers, supra note 3, at 1273.
13. See Scott, supra note 3.
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determine the bargain-in-fact. If the goal of contract law is to give
effect to the subjective bargain of the parties, insofar as we can
determine that intention through objective manifestations, then
differences in the relevant objective manifestations may well reflect
differences in result. Whether the result is predictable to another pair
of contracting parties depends upon whether the parties can predict
the content of the objective manifestations that will be used as
interpretive guides to their intentions.
Predicting accurately may not be easy. Take, for example, the
opinion in Jim Bowers' imaginary case of Bank v. Fred, which
concerns a blue promissory note.' Jim asks whether the opinion
disposes of the next case, in which the promissory note is pink. He
writes:
If we passed kindergarten, we know that pink isn't literally
blue either. We can say, however, that the world would
contain less welfare if we imposed needless and potentially
costly color formalities on the promise-making process. That
normative standard justifies us in disregarding the color
distinctions in the two cases. 5
"Needless and potentially costly," there's the rub! How does the
court, or the lawyers who are arguing the case, know that the color
formalities are needless and potentially costly? Jim assumes (I think
correctly) that there is no benefit to distinguishing between
promissory notes on the basis of color. But suppose the case
concerned a warehouse receipt or bill of lading? Here, a practice has
developed to distinguish negotiable documents of title from non-
negotiable ones on the basis of color. Negotiable documents are
printed on colored paper-warehouse receipts are green and
negotiable bills of lading are yellow-whereas non-negotiable
documents are printed on white paper. So, the idea that the meaning
of a contract might be affected by the color of the paper on which it
is written may not be as outrageous as it first appears. Conceivably,
different judicial opinions might reach opposing results on the
principled basis of the color of the paper, yet the outcome of the
second case would be unpredictable to the casual observer. And,
unless the second opinion explained the considerations carefully, it
might even convey the impression that the opinions cannot be
:reconciled.
Contributing to the unpredictability is the fact that some of the
interpretive guides, especially course of performance, acquire their
content after the written contract has been signed. The "solution" to
14. See Bowers, supra note 3, at 1250.
15. Id. at 1252.
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this uncertainty is for the parties either to acquiesce in the idea that
the court will call it as it sees it and take the leap of faith that the
court will get it right, or contract out with sufficient clarity ("and we
really mean it"). The question, of course, is whether the parties really
do mean it-and if they act as if they do not, whether the world is a
better place if we hold them to their words or if we give legal effect
to their adaptations over time.
We are left with finding the right recipe for reading words in
context. If we give too much room for context to determine outcomes
in a search for perfect justice (or for a perfect understanding of the
bargain of the parties), we may risk errors in interpretation and may
increase uncertainty. However, if we limit the evidence that can be
used, we create problems of over-inclusion and under-inclusion to
which Jim Bowers' paper refers. Perhaps in an ideal world we would
be able to determine the relative error, uncertainty, and transaction
costs generated by each possible level of generality. But even if we
knew those, framing a statute that successfully uses the data as the
basis for the applicable legal rules and successfully prompts the
judiciary to decide cases in a manner that actually minimizes the costs
would be a daunting task. As written, the U.C.C. leaves ample room
for effectuating the parties' bargain in fact by determining whether
there is relevant evidence of context and applying the evidence
judiciously. The insights generated by the academic debate are, at
least at this stage of their development, unlikely to yield a workable
improvement.
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